When commenting on the United States' decision to treat PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorists, China responded by defending non-interference between countries, in a move by Trump that divides the world, with Brazil against it and nations like Ecuador – CPG Click Petróleo e Gás

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Interesting facts
Commenting on the United States’ decision to treat the PCC and the Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations, China responded by defending the principle of non-interference between countries. The spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mao Ning, stated that Beijing always defends non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, in a measure by Donald Trump’s government that has been dividing the world, with Brazil against and countries like Ecuador and Honduras in favor.
The statement from China occurred on May 29, 2026, a day after the U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, announced the inclusion of the two Brazilian factions in the U.S. lists of terrorist organizations. The Chinese statement, contained and diplomatic, is a typical response from Beijing to issues involving the sovereignty of other countries, and serves as a barometer for the international repercussion of a decision that directly affects Brazil.
The Chinese reaction was short but loaded with diplomatic symbolism. “China always defends non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries,” declared Mao Ning at a press conference when asked about Trump’s decision. The phrase does not mention Brazil or the United States by name, but the message is clear in the context of the question.
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This principle of non-interference is one of the historical pillars of Chinese foreign policy, frequently invoked by Beijing when the subject involves the sovereignty of third countries. For international relations analysts, the statement can be read as a nod to Brasília, with whom China maintains a strong commercial relationship, without, however, creating direct friction with Washington, in a careful diplomatic balance typical of the Chinese style.
To understand the impact, it is necessary to know the American measure. The Trump administration decided to classify the PCC, the Primeiro Comando da Capital, and the Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations, in a measure with two legal layers announced by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on May 28, 2026. The decision places the Brazilian factions on a list that includes groups like Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Sinaloa Cartel.
In the first stage, the groups are classified as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, which allows for swift sanctions by the U.S. Treasury Department against their leaders and those who associate with them. Starting June 5, they will be considered Foreign Terrorist Organizations, a more severe designation. According to the American government, the FBI has identified cells of the PCC and CV in 12 U.S. states, which Washington uses as justification for the measure.
On the Brazilian side, the response was one of firm rejection. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stated that Brazil will combat organized crime internally and will not accept foreign interference, defending national sovereignty with the phrase “we will not accept being treated like fools, as if we were a banana republic”, during an event in Sergipe.
The Brazilian government, through the national public security secretary Mario Sarrubo, had already rejected the American request to classify the factions as terrorists, according to Reuters. The central argument is that Brazil has its own legislation to classify criminal organizations and that, under Brazilian law, the PCC and CV do not fit as terrorist groups. Lula also criticized the articulation of Brazilian parliamentarians, including Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, with the American government in favor of the measure.
The Brazilian fear has an underlying reason that deserves to be explained clearly. The main fear of the Lula government, according to sources, is that the designation of the factions as terrorists opens the door for some type of U.S. intervention in Brazilian territory, under the justification of combating terrorism, violating national sovereignty.
This fear is not abstract: in other Latin American countries, such as Ecuador, Washington’s anti-terror rhetoric has already been associated with more incisive actions. It is worth noting, however, that this is a concern and a political assessment of the Brazilian government and some analysts, not a concrete action already announced by the United States. The interpretation of the real intentions behind the measure divides experts and political actors.
The American decision does not generate consensus among the countries in the region. While Brazil and Mexico oppose the classification of local factions as terrorists, nations like Ecuador and Honduras support the U.S. approach, in a split that reflects different views on how to tackle organized crime and the role of Washington in this fight.
Ecuador, for example, has already had local factions designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the United States, in cooperation that the Ecuadorian government views favorably. This division shows how the issue goes beyond Brazil and is part of a broader debate on security, sovereignty, and American influence in Latin America, at a time of reorganization of relations on the continent.
Internally, in Brazil, the measure also divides opinions, and it is fair to present both sides. On one side, supporters like prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya, from Gaeco in São Paulo, argue that the American designation can help combat transnational organized crime, hindering the finances and international logistics of factions that already operate beyond Brazilian borders.
On the other hand, critics argue that the measure could serve as a pretext to expand harsher U.S. immigration policies and, according to some more forceful analyses, even to influence the Brazilian political scene in an election year. It is worth emphasizing that these interpretations about the intentions behind the decision are evaluations by analysts and political positions, not confirmed facts, and should be read as part of an open debate.
Beyond diplomacy, the issue has concrete implications. Brazil’s relationship with its two largest trading partners, the United States and China itself, is a key piece of the national economy, and episodes like this place the country at the center of a power struggle between the world’s two largest powers, with possible repercussions on trade, investments, and cooperation.
By defending non-interference, China aligns itself with the Brazilian government’s sovereignty discourse, while the United States adopts a more interventionist stance in combating regional organized crime. For Brazil, balancing these relationships, defending its autonomy without breaking strategic commercial bridges, is a delicate diplomatic challenge that is likely to intensify in the coming months.
China’s response, defending non-interference, is another chapter in a topic that mixes public security, sovereignty, and geopolitics. Trump’s decision to treat PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorists divides countries and analysts, between those who see it as a tool to combat transnational crime and those who see risks to Brazilian sovereignty. In the middle of this dispute is Brazil, which rejects the label but acknowledges the violence of the factions, and needs to navigate carefully between the pressures and interests of the great powers. It is a debate that is just beginning.
And you, what do you think about the United States’ decision to classify PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations? Do you agree with Brazil’s stance of rejecting the measure in the name of sovereignty, or do you believe it would help in the fight against organized crime? Leave your comment, respecting differing opinions, and share the article with those who follow geopolitics and security.
I cover technology, innovation, oil and gas, and provide daily updates on opportunities in the Brazilian market. I have published over 7,000 articles on the websites CPG, Naval Porto Estaleiro, Mineração Brasil, and Obras Construção Civil. For topic suggestions, please contact me at brunotelesredator@gmail.com.
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